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ARGUMENT. 
CONTRARY TO THE APPELLEES ARGUMENT, THIS COURT IS THE 
ONLY COURT THAT CAN ADDRESS HARMON'S § 1983 CLAIMS -
THIS COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION. 
In Ogden's Brief, pages 42-44, Ogden argues for the rejection by this Court 
to address his § 1983 claims. Ogden urges this Court to believe it is without 
jurisdiction. Ogden brief p. 43. This Court should not be inadvertently led astray 
by the argument. In another matter this Court is familiar with, Joseph v. Salt Lake 
City Civil Serv. Comm'q 53 P.3d 11 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 63 P.3d 
104, cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 133, 157 L. Ed. 2d 40 (2003), this counsel the 
undersigned represented Joseph in his subsequent § 1983 and RICO action filed in 
U.S. District Court against Salt Lake City Corporation. Joseph's action was 
dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In the recent December 15, 
2006 decision Joseph v. Corradini. 05-4181 (unpublished), the U.S. Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. In it's 28 page decision, at page 13, the 
Court stated: 
First, Mr. Joseph argues that Salt Lake City "deprived Joseph [of] due 
process in the manner it had prosecuted [him] during the course of the Salt 
Lake City Civil Service Proceedings." Appellant's Br. 26-27. The problem 
with his claim, however, is that the Utah Court of Appeals has already held 
"that the Commission did not violate Joseph's due process right to a post-
deprivation hearing." Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 53 P.3d 
at 16. The Utah Court of Appeals' holding stemmed from Joseph's multiple 
failures, though he was represented by counsel, to comply with the City's 
discovery requests. See id. at 14, 16. Because this claim already has been 
litigated to finality between these same parties, the doctrine of claim 
preclusion bars this cause of action. Wilkes v. Wyo. Dep 't of Employment 
Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 2002). 
Order and Judgment p. 13. (See Addendum A). 
In Joseph, 53 P.3d at 14-15, this Court addressed jurisdiction, stating: 
% 8 Prior to addressing Joseph's claim, we must first determine whether this 
court is properly vested with jurisdiction over his claim. While we are 
generally limited in our authority to address issues sua sponte, see In re 
R.N.J., 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("if a [party] has not raised 
an issue on appeal, we may not consider the issue sua sponte" (quoting 
State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d 1228, 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)) (alteration in 
original)), when the issue is jurisdictional we are under no such limitation. 
See id. "[T]he jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals . . . must be provided by 
statute." DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 764 P.2d 627, 627 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (citing Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5). In the absence of a specific statute 
granting this court jurisdiction over the subject matter, we have no 
jurisdiction. See Barney v. Division of Occupational & Profl. Licensing, 
828 P.2d 542, 543-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DeBry, 764 P.2d at 628. 
f 9 Here, were we restricted to the jurisdictional boundaries found in Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(b)(i) (Supp.2001) (granting this court jurisdiction 
over appeals from the district court's review of "adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies"), we 
would not have jurisdiction and would be forced to dismiss the petition. See 
Barney, 828 P.2d at 544. However, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 (1999) 
provides an express grant of jurisdiction to this court for the specific 
purpose of reviewing decisions made by municipal commissions. 
Therefore, because the Legislature has provided a specific statute granting 
this court jurisdiction, we conclude that we have jurisdiction and address 
Joseph's claim on appeal. 
14, at 14-15. (footnote omitted). 
In light of the situation it would appear that this Court is the only court of 
2 
jurisdiction to address § 1983 claims of this nature. By the Joseph 05-4181 
decision of the Tenth Circuit, Harmon is precluded from addressing § 1983 claims 
anywhere else, even if he were to comply with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
The Rooker -Feldman doctrine takes its name from the only two cases in 
which we have applied this rule to find that a federal district court lacked 
jurisdiction. In Rooker, a party who had lost in the Indiana Supreme Court, and 
failed to obtain review in this Court, filed an action in federal district court 
challenging the constitutionality of the state-court judgment. The Supreme Court 
viewed the action as tantamount to an appeal of the Indiana Supreme Court 
decision, over which only the Supreme Court had jurisdiction, and said that the 
"aggrieved litigant cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he no longer can do 
directly." 263 U.S., at 416, 44 S. Ct. 149. Feldman, decided 60 years later, 
concerned slightly different circumstances, with similar results. The plaintiffs 
there had been refused admission to the District of Columbia bar by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals, and sought review of these decisions in federal 
district court. The Supreme Court decision held that to the extent plaintiffs 
challenged the Court of Appeals decisions themselves - as opposed to the bar 
admission rules promulgated nonjudicially by the Court of Appeals - their sole 
avenue of review was with the Supreme Court. 460 U.S., at 476, 103 S. Ct. 1303. 
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Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a rationale for a wide-reaching bar 
on the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our cases since Feldman have 
tended to emphasize the narrowness of the Rooker - Feldman rule. See Exxon 
Mobil, 544 U.S., at 292, 125 S. Ct. 1517 (Rooker - Feldman does not apply to 
parallel state and federal litigation); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of 
Md.. 535 U.S. 635, 644, n. 3, 122 S. Ct. 1753, 152 L. Ed. 2d 871 (2002) {Rooker -
Feldman "has no application to judicial review of executive action, including 
determinations made by a state administrative agency" ); Johnson v. De Grandy. 
512 U.S. 997, 1005-1006, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 129 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1994) {Rooker -
Feldman does not bar actions by a nonparty to the earlier state suit). Indeed, 
during that period, "[the Supreme Court] has never applied Rooker - Feldman to 
dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic 
Industries Corp.. 544 U.S. 280, 287, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). 
Believing the U.S. District Court had parallel jurisdiction conveyed to it by 
Congress, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Joseph filed suit against Salt Lake City for 
violating his due process in the manner in which he was prosecuted. The evidence 
obtained during discovery in the § 1983 action revealed that Salt Lake City relied 
on perjured testimony and had deliberately concealed evidence in order to obtain 
the decision it had in the former Civil Service Proceedings. Some of Joseph's 
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evidence was retrieved in the matter, Joseph v. McCann. 147 P.3d 547 (2006). 
The language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should have prevented the application of 
collateral estoppel. It plainly reads: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial 
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, 
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was 
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this 
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (emphasis added). 
Despite Ogden's contentions and despite the otherwise apparent plain 
reading of § 1983 providing means for "redress." According to the Tenth Circuit 
decision in Joseph 05-4181, it is the contention of the Tenth Circuit that the court 
of "redress" is this Court. § 1983 does not require the redress proceed in district 
court. If the Congress wanted to limit the court of redress to be district court it 
would have said so. The chosen language instead reads, "shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress." L± 
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In light of this Court's decision in Joseph, 53 P.3d 11, it would appear that 
this Court will agree and accept § 1983 jurisdiction. This Court said "because the 
Legislature has provided a specific statute granting this court jurisdiction, we 
conclude that we have jurisdiction and address Joseph's claim on appeal." 
Consistent with Joseph. Harmon appears before this Court and urges this Court to 
accept § 1983 jurisdiction "because" the Congress has provided a specific statute 
granting this court jurisdiction, this Court should conclude it has jurisdiction of 
those claims. 
In Harmon's opening brief, Harmon asserted his § 1983 claim for not 
addressing his stigmatizing concerns and for its failure to perfect his name 
clearing hearing. Mr. Harmon is entitled to clear the air concerning whether he is 
a liar or not. Being free to continue labeling Mr. Harmon as a liar without a final 
adjudication of those relevant facts is forever distressful to Harmon and according 
to Board of Regents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 
(1971), he is entitled to the opportunity to fairly and fully clear his name. 
CONCLUSION, 
Having replied to Ogden's Brief, Harmon hereby respectfully requests this 
Court to issue a Memorandum Decision in this matter in his favor as to all his 
issues. 
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No. 04-4212 
(D.C. No. 2-.00-CV-340 DAK) 
(District of Utah) 
No. 05-4181 
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-340 DAK) 
(District of Utah) 
Defendants-Appellees. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 
Before BRISCOE, HOLLOWAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. 
This is the second time Plaintiff Robert L. Joseph has appeared before this 
Court to challenge district court rulings in favor of persons and entities he claims 
participated in an unconstitutional cabal to remove him from the Salt Lake City 
Police Department. In his first appeal, we affirmed the district court 's grant of 
summary judgment to David Yocum, the Salt Lake County District Attorney, and 
Salt Lake County on Mr. Joseph's malicious prosecution claim. Joseph v. Yocum, 
53 F. App'x 1, 4 (10th Cir. 2002). This appeal comprises claims under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 against other employees of the Salt Lake County District Attorney's 
office, Salt Lake City, and officers of the Salt Lake City Police Department. We 
hold that the district court properly dismissed each defendant and therefore 
AFFIRM its judgments. 
I. Facts 
Late in the evening of March 26, 1999, Mr. Joseph, who was then a Salt 
Lake City police officer, met his wife, Rachelle, at a park to give her a house key 
*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th 
Cir. R. 32.1. 
-2-
because she had been inadvertently locked out of their home. While they were 
conversing, a car passed them at excessive speed. Mr. Joseph left the park and 
pursued the car. When Mr. Joseph caught the speeding motorist, an altercation 
ensued. Mr. Joseph claims that the motorist opened the door and put the car in 
motion, thereby scooping him onto the car. Mr. Joseph fired his weapon at the 
suspect eleven times before the motorist drove away. 
Rachelle Joseph happened upon the scene as she was driving home, before 
any other officers arrived but after the motorist had driven away. Mr. Joseph told 
her he had been involved in a shooting and asked her to leave. She obliged, but 
had not gone far when she saw emergency vehicles with lights on driving in her 
husband's direction. Fearing for his safety, Mrs. Joseph returned to the scene. 
Since the area was cordoned off when she arrived, Mrs. Joseph approached 
Officer Poulsen at the scene perimeter, told him who she was, and asked to see 
her husband. Officer Poulsen let Mrs. Joseph, who was upset and crying, into his 
car so he could take her to the scene to talk to Mr. Joseph. Subsequent events at 
the shooting scene led her to file a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 
violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. We discuss those events in greater 
detail below, when reviewing the district court 's dismissal of her claim. 
Both the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney's office investigated Mr. Joseph's role in the shooting. The 
D.A.'s office assigned defendant Steve Bartlett to the case. As a result of the 
-3-
investigations by Mr. Bartlett and others, Mr. Joseph was eventually indicted for 
second-degree aggravated assault. Before trial, however, the D.A.'s office 
dropped the charges. On January 18, 2000, defendant Richard Shepherd wrote a 
letter to former Salt Lake City Police Chief Arthur Connole describing the 
decision of the D.A.'s office to file and subsequently drop charges against Mr. 
Joseph. 
Even though Mr. Joseph never stood trial for the shooting, he was 
terminated from the police force. He appealed his termination to the Salt Lake 
City Civil Service Commission, but failed to participate in discovery. The City 
eventually filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Joseph's appeal as a sanction for his 
refusal to cooperate. Shortly before the Commission was scheduled to rule on 
that motion, Mr. Joseph, through counsel, agreed to provide all the materials the 
City had requested within fifteen days. Mr. Joseph failed to live up to his end of 
the bargain, however, and the City again moved to dismiss. This time, the 
Commission granted its request. Mr. Joseph appealed the Commission's decision 
to the Utah Court of Appeals, claiming that he had been denied the due process 
right to challenge his termination. The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the 
Commission's decision, specifically rejecting Mr. Joseph's due process argument. 
Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm '», 53 P.3d 11,16 (Utah Ct. App. 
2002). The Utah Court of Appeals ' judgment became final after both the Utah 
Supreme Court, Jo seph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 63 P.3d 104 (Utah 
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2002), and the United States Supreme Court, Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 821 (2003), denied certiorari. 
Mr. Joseph then filed this § 1983 case in the district court. The district 
court dismissed all claims against Mr. Yocum and Salt Lake County, and this 
Court affirmed. Joseph, 53 F. App'x at 4. Mr. Joseph then amended his 
complaint to allege malicious prosecution claims against Mr. Shepherd and Mr. 
Bartlett. He also alleged that Salt Lake City denied him due process during the 
Civil Service Commission hearings. 
II : His tory and Standard of Review 
Case number 04-4212 is Mr. Joseph's appeal from the grant of a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the malicious prosecution claims against Mr. Shepherd 
and Mr. Bartlett. We review de novo the district court 's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss, "applying the same standards as the district court." Moore v. 
Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th Cir. 2006). We accept all well-pleaded 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them "in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But 
merely conclusory allegations in a complaint do not constitute well-pleaded 
factual allegations. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006). 
Case number 05-4181 is the Josephs' appeal of the district court 's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City and Officers Mendez and Zelig on 
their due process and Fourth Amendment claims. "We review the grant of 
-5-
summary judgment de novo and affirm only if the record, considered in the light 
most favorable to the [nonmoving party], establishes no genuine issue of material 
fact, and the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Westland 
Holdings, Inc. v. Lay, 462 F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). 
III. The Malicious Prosecution Claims 
A. Richard Shepherd 
In January 2000, Richard Shepherd was the director of the Criminal 
Division in the Salt Lake County District Attorney's office. On January 18, 2000, 
he wrote a letter to then-Police Chief Arthur Connole describing his office's 
decision to file and then dismiss criminal charges against Mr. Joseph for Joseph's 
role in the March 26, 1999, shooting. The letter contained Mr. Shepherd's 
opinion of the legality of Mr. Joseph's conduct, concluding with this statement: 
"Unfortunately there are factual disputes that exist and there is no other forum 
available to resolve these issues. The only conclusion I can assert with some 
finality is that the decision was made not to proceed further with criminal 
prosecution." Appellees ' Br., Ex. H, at 2. Mr. Joseph's claims against Mr. 
Shepherd relate solely to Shepherd's authorship of that letter. Appellant 's Br. 8. 
Since this letter followed the dismissal of criminal charges against Mr. 
Joseph, it cannot form the basis for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. See 
Roska ex rel Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1244 (10th Cir. 2003). The only 
-6-
possible due process claim it may raise is an infringement upon Mr. Joseph's 
'"liberty interest in [his] good name and reputation as it affects [his] property 
interest in continued employment. '" Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards & 
Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1153 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Workman v. Jordan, 32 
F.3d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1994)). The district court held that Mr. Joseph failed to 
state a claim. We agree. 
To establish this type of liberty deprivation, a plaintiff must allege and 
prove each of these four elements: " 'First, . . . the statements must impugn the 
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity of the employee. Second, the 
statements must be false. Third, the statements must occur in the course of 
terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment opportunities. And 
fourth, the statements must be published. '" Id. (quoting Workman, 32 F.3d at 
481). 
Mr. Joseph's brief does not cite to the paragraphs in his complaint that 
allege these four elements. The complaint is particularly deficient in two 
respects. First, although the complaint contains the conclusory allegation that the 
letter was "falsified," it does not identify any specific statements of purported 
facts that it alleges both to be false and to impugn his reputation. Mr. Shepherd's 
letter states that "[t]he only conclusion I can assert with some finality is that the 
decision was made not to proceed further with criminal prosecution." Appellees' 
Br., Ex. H, at 2. That statement—the only factual conclusion asserted with "some 
-7-
finality"—is undoubtedly true, and it does not impugn his reputation. Mr. Joseph 
does not contend otherwise. The letter also states that "[ujnfortunately there are 
factual disputes that exist," but again, Mr. Joseph does not contend this is false 
(indeed, his account of the events in question seems to corroborate rather than 
contradict the presence of factual disputes). Nor does this statement impugn Mr. 
Joseph's reputation. In his brief, Mr. Joseph seems to argue that the problem with 
the letter is that it insinuated the reason for dismissing the case was lack of, or 
uncertainty about, the evidence, rather than that Mr. Joseph was exonerated. But 
Mr. Joseph's obligation as a plaintiff is to identify a statement in the letter that is 
false and that impugns his good name. Failure to exonerate him is not the same 
as impugning his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. 
Second, the complaint contains no allegation that Mr. Shepherd "published" 
the letter. Internal communications, if not made public, can have no effect on an 
employee's good name or reputation, and there is no allegation in the complaint 
that the defendants made the letter public. See Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
J, 149 F.3d 1228, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Also fatal to plaintiff's liberty interest 
claim is the fact that the defendants made no public statements disparaging [the 
plaintiff] or harming his standing or associations in the community. The Supreme 
Court has rejected the theory that the mere fact of dismissal, absent some 
publicizing of the reasons for the action, could amount to a stigma infringing 
one's liberty." (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); Dickeson v. 
-8-
Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1440 (10th Cir. 1988) ("A liberty interest is not 
violated when one is discharged without public disclosure of the reasons for the 
discharge."). Accordingly, we affirm the district court 's judgment dismissing this 
cause of action for failure to state a claim. 
B. Steve Bartlett 
Steve Bartlett was the district attorney's office investigator assigned to Mr. 
Joseph's shooting incident. Mr. Joseph alleges in his § 1983 malicious 
prosecution claim that Mr. Bartlett "conducted [a] deliberate investigation against 
him" by allegedly failing to "follow[] the protocol, . . . to implore [sic] his own 
judgment . . . , and deliberately whether knowingly or recklessly, withheld the 
State Crime Lab information from prosecutors at the time of screening." 
Appellant's Br. 6. The district court held that Mr. Bartlett was entitled to 
prosecutorial immunity and qualified immunity. It also held that Mr. Joseph's 
claims against Mr. Bartlett were barred by claim and issue preclusion. 
We affirm the district court 's judgment granting absolute immunity to Mr. 
Bartlett for his role "in presenting criminal charges to the D.A. by personally 
preparing an information against Officer Joseph [and by] ob ta in ing] an arrest 
warrant." Appellant 's App. 60. Though Mr. Bartlett is not the prosecutor, 
prosecutorial immunity extends to certain agents of the prosecutor when they are 
engaged in performing tasks that are inherently prosecutorial in nature. As we 
explained in Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2005), when 
-9-
determining whether a defendant is entitled to absolute immunity, we employ a 
functional approach that examines " ' the nature of the function [the defendant] 
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it . '" Id. at 1133 (quoting 
Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1314 (10th Cir. 
1999)). An investigator who prepares a criminal complaint and seeks an arrest 
warrant is therefore entitled to absolute immunity. Roberts v. Kling, 144 F.3d 
710, 711 (10th Cir. 1998). With regard to the district court 's holding that Mr. 
Bartlett enjoys absolute prosecutorial immunity for his role in these two actions, 
this case is controlled by Roberts, and we affirm. 
We also agree that qualified immunity shields Mr. Bartlett from liability 
with regard to the other allegations in Mr. Joseph's complaint. "In order to defeat 
a qualified immunity defense, 'a plaintiff must show that (1) the official violated 
a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was 
clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. '" Johnson ex rel. Estate 
ofCano v. Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mimics, Inc. v. 
Village of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005)). 
Mr. Joseph fails at step one. We recently reiterated that in constitutional 
tort cases, "the common law tort serves as an important guidepost for defining the 
constitutional cause of action," but "the ultimate question is always whether the 
plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation." Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 
1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th 
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Cir. 1996)). Most of Mr. Joseph's factual allegations simply do not state a Fourth 
Amendment violation. It is not unconstitutional for a district attorney's office 
employee to investigate a crime as his superiors direct, nor is it unconstitutional 
for an investigator to rely upon a fellow officer's investigation when determining 
whether probable cause for an arrest exists. See United States v. Troutman, 458 
F.2d 217, 220 (10th Cir. 1972). While withholding exculpatory evidence that 
would vitiate probable cause for an arrest can amount to a Fourth Amendment 
violation, see Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1292, Mr. Joseph does not allege that this 
occurred here. 
In Grubbs v. Bailes, 445 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006), this Court said 
that "[t]he constitutional inquiry" for a claim such as Mr. Joseph's "focuses on 
the materiality of the misconduct in relation to the determination of probable 
cause." Id. The Court continued: 
Where information has been omitted from an affidavit, we determine 
the existence of probable cause by examining the affidavit as if the 
omitted information had been included and inquiring if the affidavit 
would still have given rise to probable cause for the warrant. 
If hypothetically correcting the misrepresentation or omission 
would not alter the determination of probable cause, the misconduct 
was not of constitutional significance and is not actionable under § 
1983; but if this hypothesizing would alter the probable-cause 
determination, the misconduct undermined Fourth Amendment 
guarantees and may support redress under § 1983. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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Mr. Joseph's brief does not direct us to specific averments in his complaint 
that describe what facts Mr. Bartlett allegedly neglected to tell prosecutors. Out 
of an abundance of caution, we examined the complaint ourselves and reviewed 
such allegations. The seven or so we found do not on their face vitiate probable 
cause for Mr. Joseph's arrest, nor does he explain in his brief how they might do 
so. Accordingly, Mr. Joseph's allegations do not state a Fourth Amendment 
violation, and the district court properly held that Mr. Bartlett was entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
IV. The Due Process and Fourth Amendment Claims 
Case number 05-4181 involves appeals by Robert Joseph and his wife, 
Rachelle Joseph, from the district court 's judgment in favor of Salt Lake City 
Corporation, Lieutenant Zelig, and Sergeant Mendez. The Josephs ' opening brief 
lists eight issues for appeal but contains argument sections corresponding only to 
three of them.1 We will address only those three issues they briefed, for "[o]n 
appeal, . . . parties must do more than offer vague and unexplained complaints of 
error. Perfunctory complaints that fail to frame and develop an issue are not 
sufficient to invoke appellate review." Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1255 
(10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
*In addition to the two issues discussed below, Mr. Joseph challenges the 
district court 's dismissal of his complaint against Salt Lake City as a sanction for 
scandalous litigation practices. See Appellant 's Br. 37-44. Because we affirm 
the dismissal on the merits, we need not address this alternative holding. 
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A. Salt Lake City 
First, Mr. Joseph argues that Salt Lake City "deprived Joseph a [sic] due 
process in the manner it had prosecuted [him] during the course of the Salt Lake 
City Civil Service Proceedings." Appellant 's Br. 26-27 . The problem with this 
claim, however, is that the Utah Court of Appeals has already held "that the 
Commission did not violate Joseph's due process right to a post-deprivation 
hearing." Joseph v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 53 P.3d at 16. The Utah 
Court of Appeals ' holding stemmed from Joseph's multiple failures, though he 
was represented by counsel, to comply with the City's discovery requests. See id. 
at 14, 16. Because this claim already has been litigated to finality between these 
same parties, the doctrine of claim preclusion bars this cause of action. Wilkes v. 
Wyo. Dep't of Employment Div. of Labor Standards, 314 F.3d 501, 504 (10th Cir. 
2002). 
B. Rachelle Joseph 
Rachelle Joseph sued Lieutenant Mark Zelig and Sergeant Jerry Mendez 
under § 1983 for allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment rights after she 
voluntarily returned to the shooting scene. She alleges that she was detained in a 
locked police car for several hours, even after she had given a statement to a 
police officer and had expressed a desire to go home. She contends that this 
encounter constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and that 
the length of the detention—four hours—was unreasonable. Appellant's Br. 47. 
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The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant officers, and we 
affirm. 
1. Factual Background and District Court Ruling 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Joseph and her minor son were the first people on 
the scene after the shooting. Her husband told her that he had just been involved 
in a shooting and asked her to leave. She left but soon saw emergency vehicles 
with lights on speeding towards her husband, so she voluntarily returned to the 
scene. Her purpose in returning was to make sure her husband was unharmed. 
Appellant's App. 886, 944, 951. 
She arrived around 1:00 a.m. By that time, the police had set up a 
perimeter around the scene. She approached Officer Poulsen, who is not a 
defendant, and told him who she was and that she had been with her husband just 
prior to the shooting. She and her son got into his car so he could take them to 
the scene and facilitate a visit with Mr. Joseph. Id. at 945, 951. They sat with 
Officer Poulsen in his car for half an hour to forty-five minutes. Id. at 887, 945, 
952. After sitting with Officer Poulsen for some amount of time, "somebody 
came in and told [Officer Poulsen] to take" Mrs. Joseph's statement, which he 
did. R. Joseph Dep., Appellee 's Supp. App. 92. Mrs. Joseph does not "remember 
exactly" what she said to him. Id. at 93. At about this same time—about half an 
hour to forty-five minutes after she arrived at the scene—Mrs. Joseph testified 
that Officer Poulsen told her that Officer Mendez had requested that she be taken 
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to the police station for questioning. Appellant's App. 887, 946, 952. Mrs. 
Joseph never spoke directly with Officer Mendez; rather, she learned of Mendez's 
request from Officer Poulsen and Officer Zelig. Id. at 887, 953. Either as part of 
this conversation or somewhat later, Mrs. Joseph spoke to her husband and 
learned for the first time that he was "okay." Supp. App. 100.2 
According to her version of the events,3 she remained in the police car until 
she was told, apparently by Detective Wooldridge, a non-defendant, that she 
could leave and that she would be interviewed later. App. 890. In her deposition, 
Mrs. Joseph estimated that she returned home between 3:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. 
Supp. App. 103. In her affidavit, she stated that she "got home around 5:30 a.m." 
App. 888. She estimated that her home was about a 25 minute drive from the 
scene of the shooting. Supp. App. 102. As is appropriate on a motion for 
2Mrs. Joseph's deposition testimony differed from her affidavit with regard 
to the precise time of these events. In her deposition, she estimated that Officer 
Poulsen told her she had to go to the station between 30 and 45 minutes after her 
arrival, Supp. App. 97, and she talked with her husband more than an hour, and 
possibly more than two hours, after her arrival. Id. at 100. In her affidavit, 
which was prepared subsequent to her deposition, Mrs. Joseph stated that the 
request that she be taken to the station for questioning and her conversation with 
her husband occurred at the same time, about half an hour after she arrived at the 
scene of the shooting. App. 887. Neither party treats these discrepancies as 
material. 
3Officer Poulsen testified by affidavit that Mrs. Joseph left the scene 
"shortly after she spoke with her husband and determined he was okay," that he 
was never asked or ordered by any officer to detain her, and that she was not 
detained. Poulsen Aff. at 2, App. 858. For purposes of summary judgment, the 
district court properly credited Mrs. Joseph's version of the events. 
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summary judgment, the district court gave the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, 
and assumed she was in the police car for a total of four hours. 
During the period between her last contact with Officer Zelig and her 
departure for home, Mrs. Joseph remained in the locked police car. App. 888-89. 
But, according to her account, she was not isolated. In addition to conversations 
with Officer Poulsen and her husband, "other officers came to check and see if I 
was alright." R. Joseph Aff. at 5, App. 888. She mentioned three officers by 
name: Mark Schuman, Cameron Piatt, and Chad Lambourne. Id. She told these 
(or perhaps other) officers that she wanted to go home because one of her children 
was sick and she needed to give him medicine. Id. at 888-89. An officer from 
either the Sandy or Salt Lake City Police Departments drove to Mrs. Joseph's 
home to check on her children. The officer observed the children and informed 
Mrs. Joseph that they were sleeping and appeared all right. Id. at 889. During 
the night, several officers brought her and her son hot chocolate. One officer 
took her son to use a convenience store restroom, and Officer Poulsen later took 
her and her son to another nearby restroom. Id. at 889, 892. When Mrs. Joseph 
left the scene to go home, she thanked Officer Poulsen before she left, and hugged 
him. Poulsen Aff. at 3, App. 859. 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
stating a number of alternative grounds: 
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Although there is a dispute as to the length of time Mrs. Joseph was 
at the scene of the shooting, and the court is not permitted to make factual 
determinations in the context of a summary judgment motion, the court 
nonetheless agrees with the City Defendants that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the police conduct in this case would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that she had been detained. Moreover, even if the 
undisputed facts supported the fact that Mrs. Joseph reasonably perceived 
that she was being detained, the actions of the officers were reasonable 
under the circumstances. Mrs. Joseph had indicated that she was the first 
on the scene, and it was reasonable for the officers to seek to question her. 
They understandably had certain duties that they were required to attend to 
before they could assist Mrs. Joseph in talking with her husband. There is 
no indication that the detention was painful, degrading, or unduly 
prolonged. There is no evidence that the officers used or threatened to use 
any force or that they made threatening statements. There is no evidence 
that the officers unnecessarily detained her after they learned that she had 
not seen the actual incident. 
In addition, there is no clearly established law regarding the length of 
time an officer may request that a witness stay for questioning. Thus, even 
assuming that Mrs. Joseph was actually detained at the scene of the 
shooting for over four hours, against her will, the remaining defendants 
would have qualified immunity for their actions. Accordingly, her claim 
for unlawful detention is dismissed. 
App. 81-82. Mrs. Joseph now appeals from this order. 
2. Standard of review 
Because Officers Mendez and Zelig invoked the defense of qualified 
immunity, Mrs. Joseph must show that they violated her clearly established 
Fourth Amendment rights in order to hold them liable under § 1983. Johnson ex 
rel. Estate ofCano, 455 F.3d at 1142. We review de novo a grant of summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity, "and affirm only if the record reveals no 
genuine issue of material fact." Arredondo v. Locklear, 462 F.3d 1292, 1297 
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(10th Cir. 2006). To prove that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact—i.e., 
that summary judgment is improper and a trial is necessary—the nonmoving party 
must show that "the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
non-moving party." Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 
2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242 ,248 , 255 (1986)). 
That obligation requires the nonmoving party to " 'make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at t r ial . '" Horn v. Squire, 81 F.3d 969, 
974 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322 
(1986)). It is also well established that we "may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on grounds other than those relied on by the district court when the 
record contains an adequate and independent basis for that result." Bones, 366 
F.3d at 875 (citing Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass 'n, 14 F.3d 526, 528 (10th 
Cir. 1994)). 
3. Mrs. Joseph's Brief 
The Appellants ' opening brief consists of slightly more than two pages of 
argument addressing Mrs. Joseph's detention. It contains precisely five record 
citations, four of which are citations to the district court 's order; the fifth refers to 
legal argument by the city attorney in district court. See Appellant 's Br. 45-48 . 
The brief cites one Tenth Circuit case discussing what qualifies as a seizure under 
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the Fourth Amendment but does not otherwise develop the remaining framework 
that governs suits under § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations. The 
Appellants' reply brief does not even mention Mrs. Joseph's claims. 
This is barely sufficient to invoke appellate review. See Femedeer, 227 
F.3d at 1255. Mrs. Joseph does not identify the essential elements on which she 
would bear the burden of proof at trial, Horn, 81 F.3d at 973-74, nor does she cite 
one piece of evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find in her favor on 
those (unmentioned) elements. See Bones, 366 F.3d at 875. Nor does she offer 
any reply to Appellees ' alternative ground that the detention, if it was a detention, 
was reasonable. Appellees ' Br. 44-48 . 
It is well established in this Circuit that it is not the Court 's responsibility 
to "search the record in an effort to determine whether there exists dormant 
evidence which might require submission of the case to a jury." Thomas v. 
Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1025 (10th Cir. 1992); see also 
United States v. Abdenbi, 361 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) ("This court 
should neither raise sua sponte an argument not advanced by a party either before 
the district court or on appeal, nor then advocate a particular position and resolve 
the appeal based on that advocacy."). 
Notwithstanding the deficiencies in Appellants' brief, we will set forth our 
rationale for affirmance. 
4. Analysis 
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Although the district court 's grant of summary judgment was based on a 
number of alternative grounds, Appellants focus their argument on the proposition 
that "the [district] Court should have determined that Plaintiff was seized for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and that the four hour detention was 
unreasonable." Appellants ' Br. 47. 
To determine whether the conduct of Officers Zelig and Mendez constituted 
an investigative detention, we ask whether, " ' in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not 
free to leave. '" Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). In United States v. Hill, 
199 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 1999), we identified these factors as guiding our 
determination of whether a person was subject to this type of seizure: 
the threatening presence of several officers; the brandishing of a 
weapon by an officer; some physical touching by an officer; use of 
aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with 
an officer's request is compulsory; prolonged retention of a person's 
personal effects . . . ; a request to accompany the officer to the 
station; interaction in a nonpublic place or a small, enclosed place; 
and absence of other members of the public. 
Id. at 1147-48. "None of these factors are dispositive, nor should they be treated 
as exclusive, and it may be that the strong presence of two or three factors 
demonstrates that a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to 
terminate an encounter with government officials." Fuerschbach v. Southwest 
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Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
When evaluating an investigative detention's reasonableness, we ask (1) 
was the detention "'justified at its inception, '" and (2) were the officer's actions 
"'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
in the first place'"? United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 
2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). "At both stages, the 
reasonableness of the officer's suspicions is judged by an objective standard 
taking the totality of the circumstances and information available to the officers 
into account." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Supreme 
Court has held that "an investigative detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop," Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983), and that police must "diligently pursue their 
investigation," United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983). In this 
connection, the Supreme Court has "impose[d] no rigid time limitation" on 
investigative detentions, preferring instead to let "common sense and ordinary 
human experience . . . govern over rigid criteria." United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675,685 (1985). 
The most glaring deficiency in Mrs. Joseph's case is the absence of any 
evidence connecting the supposed constitutional violation to the defendants. As 
this Court recently explained: 
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Section 1983 requires plaintiffs to show causation, imposing liability 
on a defendant who "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . 
. . to the deprivation of any rights . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We have 
explained Section 1983's causation requirement: "[A] defendant may 
not be held liable under § 1983 unless he or she subjected a citizen to 
the deprivation, or caused a citizen to be subjected to the 
deprivation." Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 518 
(10th Cir. 1988). "A plaintiff must allege factual causation—i.e. 'but 
for' causation—in order to state a claim under § 1983." Scott v. 
Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 911 (10th Cir. 2000). 
Lippoldtv. Cole,— F .3d—, 2006 WL 3200864, at *11 (10th Cir. Nov. 7 ,2006) . 
Because Mrs. Joseph intentionally omitted Officer Poulsen as a defendant and 
sued only Officers Mendez and Zelig, see Appellee's Supp. App. 113, it is 
important to identify exactly what role Mendez and Zelig played in the incident. 
In her memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, Mrs. Joseph expressly admitted "that Mendez 's involvement" with the 
incident "was limited to the following": 
a. Zelig said that Mendez wanted to have her taken to the police station to 
be interviewed. This occurred at approximately 1:30 or 1:45 a.m., one-half 
hour or forty-five minutes after Rachelle first entered Officer Poulsen's 
police car. 
b. Rachelle Joseph never personally spoke to Mendez. 
c. Rachelle Joseph has no other knowledge of Mendez's involvement with 
her alleged detention. 
Appellant 's App. 948, 958, citing R. Joseph Dep. at 39, 40, 46. Similarly, 
Appellant expressly admitted "that Zelig 's involvement is limited to the 
following": 
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a. Zelig told Officer Poulsen that Mendez wanted to have her taken to the 
police station to be interviewed. This occurred at approximately 1:30 or 
1:45 a.m., one-half hour or forty-five minutes after Rachelle first entered 
Officer Poulsen's police car. 
b. Zelig asked or told Rachelle Joseph to wait for a homicide detective to 
talk to her about the events she observed or possibly told this to someone 
else and Rachelle Joseph overheard him. This is probably the same event 
described in (a) above. 
Id. at 948-49, 959, citing R. Joseph Dep. at 39, 40, 87-89. 
By Appellants ' own admission, therefore, Officers Zelig and Mendez had 
no direct or indirect contact with Mrs. Joseph after 1:45 a.m. This was forty-five 
minutes after she voluntarily returned to the scene, no later than fifteen minutes 
after she gave her statement to Officer Poulsen, and about the same time she saw 
and spoke to her husband. Neither defendant had any further involvement in her 
alleged detention. Lieutenant Zelig's entire involvement was to convey Sergeant 
Mendez's desire that she be further questioned. There is no evidence that either 
defendant was aware that she remained in the police car as long as she did, knew 
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that she had requested to go home,4 or was otherwise aware of the conditions or 
circumstances. 
Based on this record, we conclude that the district court properly granted 
summary judgment for the defendants. It is undisputed that Mrs. Joseph was at 
the shooting scene voluntarily for between thirty and forty-five minutes, until she 
talked to her husband and learned he was not seriously injured. Because this 
portion of the encounter was consensual, it does not implicate the Fourth 
Amendment. Lopez, 443 F.3d at 1283. At the very earliest, the incident escalated 
from a consensual encounter to an investigative detention after Mrs. Joseph 
learned that Officer Mendez wanted her to be interviewed. See Shareef, 100 F.3d 
at 1500. Assuming without deciding that at this point the encounter became an 
investigative detention, Mrs. Joseph must also show that the detention was 
unreasonable, Fuerschbach, 439 F.3d at 1202, by identifying evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could conclude that her detention was not justified at its 
4In her deposition, Mrs. Joseph testified: 
Q: Did you ever tell anybody, I 've told you all I know. I want to go home? 
A. Yes. 
Q: Who did you tell that? 
A: Poulsen 
R. Joseph Dep., Supp. App. 99. In her affidavit, Mrs. Joseph stated that she told 
certain "officers" that she wanted to go home, mentioning only Cameron Piatt by 
name. R. Joseph Aff. at 5, App. 888. This was after her last conversation with 
Officer Zelig. 
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inception and not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying it, 
Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1189. 
As to the first step, the undisputed evidence shows that Officers Mendez 
and Zelig were justified in asking Mrs. Joseph to be interviewed. They knew that 
Mrs. Joseph was the first on the shooting scene and thus a possible crime witness. 
Mrs. Joseph does not argue that this judgment was unreasonable. 
Mrs. Joseph's apparent argument is that any further questioning was 
unnecessary because she had already told Officer Poulsen that she did not observe 
the shooting and did not know anything. We do not agree. There is no evidence 
that Officers Mendez or Zelig knew that Mrs. Joseph had given a statement to 
Officer Poulsen; indeed, there is no evidence that her statement to Poulsen 
preceded Mendez's decision to question her. Nor is there any evidence that they 
knew, at the time of that decision, what she said to Officer Poulsen. Moreover, 
when they asked Mrs. Joseph to be interviewed, Officers Mendez and Zelig knew 
that Mr. Joseph had been in a shooting approximately thirty to forty-five minutes 
earlier, Mrs. Joseph was the first on the scene following the shooting, and Mrs. 
Joseph was so upset that after first leaving the scene she returned, crying, to learn 
of her husband's welfare. In her deposition, Mrs. Joseph said she could not 
"remember exactly" what she said in her statement to Officer Poulsen. R. Joseph 
Dep., Supp. App. 93. Even assuming that Mendez knew that Mrs. Joseph had 
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already given a statement, it would not be unusual, or objectively unreasonable, 
for police to requestion a witness under such circumstances. 
As to the length of the detention, based on the facts in the record, no 
reasonable jury could conclude that Officers Mendez and Zelig were responsible 
for Mrs. Joseph's presumed three-and-a-half-hour stay in Officer Poulsen's 
cruiser after she had talked to her husband. Lippoldt, — F.3d —, 2006 WL 
3200864, at *11; Scott, 216 F.3d at 911. She admitted that she never spoke 
directly to Mendez, and that Mendez's only involvement was instructing Zelig to 
have someone interview her. Appellant 's App. 948, 958. There is no evidence 
that Mendez or Zelig knew, or could reasonably have foreseen, that this request 
would entail a multi-hour detention in Officer Poulsen's car, or that either of 
them had any awareness of Mrs. Joseph's situation after 1:45 a.m. Indeed, Mrs. 
Joseph expressly admits in her response to the defendants' summary judgment 
motion that she has no knowledge of either defendant's involvement after this 
time. See id. at 948-49 , 958-59. 
So far as the record reveals, it was Officer Poulsen—not the 
defendants—who was responsible for placing Mrs. Joseph in the police car and 
who was (along with two other non-defendant officers) aware of her 
circumstances and the length of time of her detention. Yet she rewarded him for 
his efforts with thanks and a hug, not with a lawsuit. 
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If Officer Poulsen were a named defendant, the length of her stay in his car 
might well require us to reverse the grant of summary judgment. But the sum 
total of the evidence relating to the two named defendants is that one officer told 
another to ask Mrs. Joseph to be interviewed, the second officer complied with 
the first officer's instruction, and then both left the scene. Based on these facts, 
no reasonable jury could conclude that Mendez and Zelig were the but-for cause 
of Mrs. Joseph's prolonged stay in Poulsen's car. This absence of predicate facts 
establishing but-for causation means that Mrs. Joseph has not alleged a 
constitutional violation attributable to these defendants. Accordingly, Officers 
Mendez and Zelig are entitled to qualified immunity. 
VI. Conclusion 
We AFFIRM the district court 's judgment dismissing Mr. Joseph's cause 
of action against Mr. Shepherd for failure to state a claim, and the district court 's 
grant of qualified immunity to Mr. Bartlett. We also AFFIRM the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City because Mr. Joseph's due process 
cause of action is barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. And we AFFIRM 
the district court 's grant of summary judgment in favor of Lieutenant Zelig and 
Sargent Mendez on Mrs. Joseph's Fourth Amendment claims. 
That leaves us with the pending motions in these two cases, which we 
resolve as follows: we GRANT the unopposed motion in case number 05-4181 to 
seal the briefs and appendices, GRANT the motion in 04-4212 to strike the 
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attachments to Mr. Joseph's motion to separate appeals, and DENY the motion in 
05-4181 to strike the appellee's brief. 
Entered for the Court, 
Michael W. McConnell 
Circuit Judge 
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